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Abstract 
This study measure the linkage of trade liberalization and labor demand elasticities. 
Using Pakistan firm-level data, spanning the course of trade liberalization, study try to 
determine whether the trade liberalization increase the own price labor demand 
elasticities in the manufacturing sector of Pakistan. Elasticities are measure for 
production workers and non-production workers for major eleven industries at individual 
level at first and later elasticities are measured by pooling data across the industries at 
aggregate level. However, in most of the industries, study unable to find any empirical 
support for the hypothesis of no relationship between trade liberalization and labor 
demand elasticities in case of Pakistan.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Historical experience of the most of the developed countries of the world clearly shows 
that policies that make an economy open to trade with the rest of the world are needed for 
sustained economic growth. In recent decades no country has achieved economic success, 
in terms of substantial improvement in living standards for its people, without being open 
to the rest of the world. The countries that have followed the Import Substitution policies 
and impose restriction on the trade flows have lagged behind. 
 
In case of Pakistan high protection regimes were followed until 1980s. the process of 
trade liberalization in trade was started in eighties, when Government of Pakistan 
liberalize economic policies and deregulate the economy under structural adjustment 
program (SAP). One of the main objectives was to make industrial sector efficient and 
competitive by removing import substitution industrialization.  
 
Trade liberalization consequences are important especially for a poor country like 
Pakistan where one-third population still live below poverty line [Siddique (2001)]. Most 
of the studies focused on the consequences of trade liberalization on poverty, income 
distribution, employment, increased inequality, and direct effect on skilled worker and 
non skilled workers1. These studies of Ravenga (1992), Bhagwati (1994), Lawrence 
(1993), Freeman (1994), and Currie (1997) have generated controversy regarding 
increased wage inequality in US and in other developing countries. But there is no 
consensus on the forces behind these changes. 
 
However, Rodrick (1997) re-examined the issue of trade liberalization, labor and wage 
inequality. He found trade can change labor demand elasticities without changing price of 
labor. Trade can make labor demand more elastic in by making output market more 
competitive and by making domestic labor more substitutable with foreign factors and 
secondly through Hicksian -Marshallian laws of factor demand. Since product market 
elasticities are likely to rise with the trade liberalization, this implies that with the 
increase in trade openness, labor demand elasticities will increase as well. It also explains 
that higher elasticities trigger more volatile responses of wages and employment to any 
exogenous shock to labor demand and higher elasticities shift bargaining power over rent 
distribution in firms which enjoys extra normal profit away from labor towards capital. 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of the trade liberalization on 
particularly own price labor-demand elasticities of both the production workers and non-
production workers in manufacturing sector of Pakistan. The study specifically tests the 
hypothesis that “trade liberalization have no impact on labor demand elasticities”. 
 
The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 is devoted to review of literature 
and description of trade reforms in Pakistan in section 3. Section 4 explains theoretical 
model, which will be estimated. In section 5 description of data and estimation procedure 
is reported and section 6 is about results for both production and non-production workers, 
and also for overall industries. Lastly, section 7 contains conclusions.  
                                                          
1 Kemal (2001), Khan (2003), Krishna et al (2001), Roderick(1997) and Currie and Hanson(1997), etc. 
 
 
2  Review of Literature  
 
The importance of the linkage between international trade (liberalized trade) and labor 
market firstly was emphasized by Roderick (1997). Study argues that trade makes the 
demand for labor more elastic which in turn leads to larger employment and wage shocks 
as a result of given vertical shift in the labor demand curve. This increase in elasticity 
also leads to the erosion of the bargaining power of the labor. 
 
Roderick (1997) pointed out two channels through which an increase in openness leads to 
an increase in labor demand elasticities. 
1. In first channel study explain that trade reforms allow cheaper imports of 
intermediate, capital inputs, semi finished goods and unassembled parts for 
assembly in the importing country. All these imports are substitute for the 
services of domestic labor. Thus substitution possibilities in production increase 
with the availability of cheaper and larger variety of inputs. 
2. The second channel, works through Hicks Marshallian Law of Factor Demand 
which can be stated as follow: “the demand for anything is likely to be more 
elastic, the more elastic is the demand for further thing which it contributes to 
produce”.  
 
However, to date limited empirical literature has not offered strong support for this 
hypothesis. Slaughter (2001) provides a very systematic empirical investigation of the 
positive effect of trade on labor demand. By using four-digit industry level data for US 
for the period of 1961-1991, study found mixed support for this hypothesis. Own price 
elasticities of the labor demand for production workers have increased overtime while 
study found no such trend for non-production workers. However, he also found time, by 
itself, is a better predicator of the elasticities than his trade related variables, which makes 
explanatory variables weak in the presence of the time dummies or it shows common 
trend in the case of production and non-production workers. 
 
As empirical evidence, Ramaswami (2003) find a positive impact of trade liberalization 
on labor demand elasticities in the Indian manufacturing sector by using industry level 
data disaggregated by states. These elasticities turn out to be negatively related to 
protection levels that vary across industries and overtime. Furthermore, they found that 
these elasticities are not only higher for Indian states with more flexible labor regulations; 
they are also impacted to a larger degree by trade reforms. Finally, they found that after 
reforms, volatility in productivity and outputs gets translated into larger wage and 
employment volatility, theoretically a possible consequence of larger labor demand 
elasticities. 
 
By using Turkish plant level data for major trade liberalization period Karishna et al.  
(2001) tested the effect of trade liberalization on labor demand elasticities. Study found 
that “labor demand seems to be unresponsive to openness in Turkey”: in the vast majority 
of the industries they considered separately, and are unable to fine statically and 
economically significant relationship between these variables. 
 
Empirical literature also has not offered strong support for this hypothesis in multi 
country case.  Fannzylber and Maloney F.M (2005) disregard this hypothesis, by using 
panel level data for three countries that experienced significant changes in trade regime 
during the period under analysis. The results showed that labor demand elasticities do 
change greatly in magnitude overtime and with level of openness to international trade. 
Moreover, in those countries test of the effect of trade openness on long run labor 
demand elasticities yield either nonsignificant or mixed results. 
 
Regulation of the market also affects the labor market. With more flexible labor 
regulation, they impacted to a larger degree by trade reforms. Hasan et al. (2003) 
estimated relationship of the trade reform and labor demand elasticities with the 
regulation of the labor market. Results of study indicate that labor demand elasticities 
increase with reduction in protection. Unlike Slaughter (2001), they do not found time to 
determine their result. Study also found that the response of labor demand elasticities to 
protection is conditioned by the nature of labor institutions. Study found that the state 
with more flexible markets see larger increases in the labor demand elasticities in 
response to reduction in protection. 
 
In case of Pakistan, Yasmin (2005) looked at how trade liberalization has affected the 
employment and labor demand elasticities in the manufacturing sector of Pakistan. The 
results indicated that trade liberalization has positively contributed towards employment 
generation in the manufacturing sector. This study investigated manufacturing sector at 
aggregate with time series analysis. There is no study found to analysis of trade 
liberalization and labor demand elasticities for individual industries. This paper adds 
compareable evidence from Pakistan and used disaggregated data by 11 industries to 
investigate relationship between trade liberalization and labor demand. 
 
3 Background of Trade Reforms in Pakistan 
 
“It is also very clear that the policies of import substitution have been 
replaced by import liberalization and export led strategy. It is this very 
strategy which ensured the rapid growth of the most dynamic emerging 
economies” [Trade policy 2005-06]. 
 
This is well known in theoretical literature that the choice of a trade regime depends 
partly on the resource endowment of the country. At the time of independence in 1947, 
Pakistan’s industrial base was confined to a few textile mills, some sugar mills and some 
cement factories, all totaling 34 units. It was considered essential for the country to 
provide adequate protection to the growing local industry against imports. To protect 
industry, government of Pakistan emphasized on the import substitution policy and 
parallel efforts were made to promote exports. For this perspective Pakistan has 
maintained a complex system of trade policy regime since 1950s. Import bans, quota, 
licensing requirements other restrictions imposed to protect the domestic industry, and 
high tariff have introduced serious distortions. The high tariffs imposed for protecting 
domestic industries and to raise the revenues have become counterproductive. They have 
resulted in smuggling and corruption. 
 
During seventies, the nationalization of the large-scale enterprises was eroded the 
business confidence. Government gave high priority to the economic policies during 
eighties to the restoration of the business confidence. In particular, the government 
initiated wide-ranging Structural Adjustment and Stabilization Program (SAP) that aimed 
at liberalizing and deregulating the economy. The adoption of these programs led to 
major changes in the industrial and in trade policies in the form of deregulation, 
privatization and trade liberalization. One of the major objectives was to make industrial 
sector efficient and competitive by removing import substitution industrialization and 
nationalization.  
 
In late 1980 and during 1990, Pakistan liberalized imports under SAP2, in order to 
enhance the capacity utilization of the domestic industry and competitiveness of the 
commodity producing sectors. Following SAP government of Pakistan has reduced 
maximum import duty rate from 250 percent in 1987-88 to 128.6 percent in 1989-90 and 
further to 110 percent in 1995-1996 (see Appendix A). On the other hand, minimum 
import duty rate has declined from 13.3 percent in 1987-1988 to 10 percent in 1989-90. 
Subsequently, it declined to 0.5 percent in 1995-96. As a result, average duty rate (un-
weighted) declined from 40.7 percent in 1987-1988 to 25.5 in 1995-96. Excluding sports 
goods and automobiles the maximum import duty rate was 35 percent in recent compared 
to 65 percent only three ago.  At present, the number of duty slabs has been reduced to 5 
with tariff rate 10 percent, 15 percent, 25 percent 35 percent, and 45 percent. A number 
of items subject to different kinds of restrictions have been reduced from 62 to 47 during 
1990-91 to 1993-94 [Kemal (2001)].  
 
Table 1. Import Duty Rates: According to Category  
 
Year 
 
1990-
91 
1991-
92 
1992-
93 
1993-
94 
1995-
96 
1996-
97 
1997-
98 
1998-
99 
1999-
00 
2000-
01 
2001-
02 
2002-
03 
Consumer Goods 
(%) 
 
38 
 
37 
 
41 
 
38 
 
43 
 
46 
 
23 
 
26 
 
19 
 
16 
 
17 
 
11 
Capital Goods 
(%) 
 
39 
 
34 
 
32 
 
30 
 
31 
 
36 
 
28 
 
24 
 
22 
 
20 
 
16 
 
11 
Total (%)  
39 
 
33 
 
35 
 
35 
 
34 
 
35 
 
23 
 
21 
 
18 
 
17 
 
15 
 
9 
Source: CBR Year Book, 1995-96& various year 
                                                          
2 Structural Adjustment and Stabilization Programs of the IMF, World Bank and other international 
financial institutions for Pakistan have called for reduction in the fiscal deficit, rationalization of tax 
structure, removal of subsidies on consumption and production, etc.  with the view fostering higher level of 
output , price stability ,etc. 
Table 1 shows the situation that Pakistan is moving towards liberalizing its imports by 
gradually declining the rates of duty on import of consumer as well as capital goods. Rate 
of decline in the duties was more for capital goods than consumer goods. Over all, duty 
rates had decline by 21 percent during the decade.  In 1997, the Government introduced 
another Tariff Reform Package on March 28, 1997.These reforms were introduced to 
revitalize the industrial production and export promotion and recommended that 
maximum tariff should be reduced to 45 percent from previous level of 65 percent with 
the exception of automobiles; the 10 percent regulatory duty was also abolished.  
 
Duty rates also showed the trend that decline in the duty rate of capital goods are higher 
than for consumer goods: duty rates on consumer goods have declined by 8 percent while 
duty rates on capital goods have declined by 11 percent from 1999-00 to 2002-03, 
 
 
 
 
           Source: CBR Year Book, 1995-96& various year.                                
 
Overall Import Liberalization in Pakistan has been a gradual process as well as a little bit 
uneven process, as shown by the downward sloping trend in average import duty in 
figure 1. In keeping with its obligation under WTO, The government of Pakistan still 
liberalizing of trade policy and consistent; to move with the international trends; to 
facilitate trade diplomacy efforts for better market access, to create a level playing field.  
 
4 Theoretical and Estimation Frame-work 
 
It is well known that change in relative prices has significant impact on welfare of the 
workers. But it is matter of vital importance to investigate the consequences of changing 
labor-demand elasticities for the economy. Rodrick (1997) explains three fundamental 
implications of more-elastic factor demands. First, higher elasticities shift the wage 
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and/or employment incidence of non-wage labor costs (e.g., payroll taxes) towards labor 
away from employers. Second, higher elasticities trigger more-volatile responses of 
wages and/or employment to any exogenous shock to labor demand. Third, higher 
elasticities shift from labor towards capital bargaining power over rent distribution in 
firms that enjoy extra-normal profits.  
 
Labor-Demand Elasticities 
 
We focus on the profit maximization approach3, output is not given rather it is 
determined endogenously, and monopolistic competition is assumed4. Therefore a 
representative firm in an industry is assumed to an inverse demand function. 
 
εθ /1−−= ijjij QPP  [1] 
ijP  denotes own price. Here subscript ‘i’ and ‘j’ represent firm i in industry j 
jP
−
 denotes industry  average price, θ is scaling factor , ijQ  denotes firms output and  Є 
denotes the (constant) price elasticity of demand. The production function is assumed to 
be Cobb-Douglas type and is given by. 
 
k
kijk
n
ij VQ
α
1=Π=  [2]  
 
kijV  denotes the kth input use here. 
For simplicity we consider Cobb-Douglas production function with three inputs capital 
(K), labor (L), and material (M) used by representative firm. 
 
γβα MLKQ =  [3] 
 
Assuming perfect competition in factors market and partially differentiating with respect 
to lth input and equating it to zero, gives the first order conditions 
 
Similarly we can find first order conditions for other inputs                 
 
)())(/11( 1/11 −−−= LMLKPw βεθ εγβα  [4] 
)())(/11( 1/11 −−−= KMLKPr αεθ εγβα  [5] 
)())(/11( 1/11 −−−= MMLKPm γεθ εγβα  [6] 
 
In the log form eq (5) can be rewritten as: 
 
                                                          
3 For more details on this concept see, Chaudry et al. (1999).  
 
4This approximates a situation in which there are a large number of varieties and each firm is an   
infinitesimal player but has some power over the pricing of its product. 
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Where the λ values are each a function of the Є. Substituting the first order conditions for 
the input material and capital in equation, we get 
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This final equation is labor demand function that depends not only on its own price but 
also on the prices of other inputs and output. All coefficients of the equation are function 
of the ‘Є’. 
  
The own price elasticity of demand for labor (w.r.t industry wage) is given as. 
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The partial derivative of the absolute value of the own price elasticity of labor demand 
with respect to product demand elasticity is given as 
 
0
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Finally we focus our attention on the demand for labor (as opposed to that for other factor 
inputs). The labor demand function is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) TPmriwl TPijtmijtrjtwijt δδδδδ ++++= lnlnln0  [12] 
 
where l is the log form of the labor demanded. Thus our final estimating equation is 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
ijtTPijtmijtrjtwijt eTPmriwl +++++= δδδδδ lnlnln0  [13] 
 
where the error term 
ijte  allows for random shocks to affect the firm’s demand for labor. 
 
5 Data Description and Estimation 
 
Data that have used for estimation are taken from Census of Manufacturing Industries 
(CMI), which is published by Statistical division, Government of Pakistan. It is only 
reliable source of firm level data, which annually surveys all registered manufacturing 
firms with at least 10 Employees. The annual survey collects firm level information about 
value of production, value added, total employment cost, average daily employment, 
material cost, industrial cost, non industrial cost, value of energy inputs, etc. on current 
prices, which have consumed by firms of different industries. 
 
CMI published for the year 1969-70, 1970-71, and 1975-76 to 1987-88, 1990-91, 1995-
96 and 2000-01. Data used in this study is of years 1987-88, 1990-91, 1995-96 and 2000-
01. All information covers industries all over Pakistan. Despite all this information, 
publications of CMI have some limitations like it published irregularly; it doesn’t show 
all existing firms in an industry rather just registered firms. 
 
All of inputs are deflated by the wholesale price index for manufacturing industries to 
obtain real values. Data on wholesale price index, raw material price index and rate of 
interest are taken from annual report SBP and Economic survey of the following years 
1992-93, 1996-97 and 2001-02. Where as data on tariff rates are taken from Pakistan 
Custom Tariff and from Yearly Book of CBR. 
 
Construction of Variables 
 
Determination of Wage Rates 
 
Wage rate (W) is calculated by dividing the total employment cost with the average daily 
person engaged. 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
ADE
TECW    
 
Fuel Prices 
Fuel prices are calculated by dividing value of fuel with the corresponding quantities. 
Fuel price index is used for proxy of fuel prices that is calculated by taking average of all 
types of fuel items.  
 
User Cost of Capital 
The calculation of the capital cost and price is a hectic work as admitted by Chaudry et 
al. (1999).  The most appropriate price of the capital is the user cost of capital, which is 
calculated as follows 
 
)( mmk rPP πδ −+=  
 
Where depreciation rate is calculated by dividing the depreciation charges (Dep-C) with 
value of fixed assets at the beginning of the year (VFA) 
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
VFA
CDepδ  
 
Where ( kP ) is user cost of capital, ( mP ) is the price index of capital goods (machinery), r 
is the rate of the interest, δ is the capital depreciation rate and mπ  is the rate of growth in 
the price index of capital. The data on price index of machinery are taken from Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin and are used as a proxy for the price index of capital. The rate of 
interest is calculated by taking the average scheduled bank’s rate on long-term advances 
to manufacturing sector. 
  
Estimation Procedure 
 
Equation (13) is our basic estimating equation that is estimated separately for each 
industry at first, and then for pooled across industries. To take into account within-
industry firm heterogeneity, we used fixed effect and random effect model. This strategy 
based on Karishna (2001). Both ‘fixed effects’ and ‘random effects’ models are estimated 
for each eleven industries in the manufacturing sector of the Pakistan. Trade Reform 
dummy included to accumulate the effect of the changed trade policy on parameter, 
which take the value of one for the post liberalization period. Also year specific intercept 
dummies (in place of the reform intercept dummy) are included to capture year-specific 
shocks common to all firms in an industry. 
 
6 Results 
 
The outcomes of our estimation of labor demand elasticities and their changes in each of 
the 11 industries are presented in Table 2. These are estimated under the fixed and 
random effects. The vast majority of the estimated elasticities ( w) lie within the range of 
−0.15 to −0.75, identified by Hammermesh (1993) as being a reasonable range of values 
for labor demand elasticities. In all of 11 cases, under both fixed effects and random 
effects model, the elasticity estimates have weak significance to trade liberalization. 
 
Here, in estimated outcomes, elasticity change is the parameter of particular interest. This 
parameter corresponding to the wage variable interacted with the liberalization dummy 
that is one in post reform period. This is shown by the denotation of ∆ w in Table 2. The 
elasticities change (∆ w) is estimated under both fixed and random effects model. 
 
It evident from the results that our estimates of the changes in labor demand elasticities 
are small in magnitude and largely insignificant. In case of all industries using fixed 
effects specifications, the null hypothesis that the change in elasticity after the reforms is 
zero, cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance as estimated ‘t-values’ of 
elasticity change are less than two. Our results are very much consistent with available 
evidence in literature as Krishna et al. (2001) in case of Turkey. 
 
Under the random effect model, results are also small in magnitude and insignificant. 
Eight out of 11 industries cases by using random effect model, the null hypothesis that 
the change in elasticity after the reforms is zero cannot be rejected at 5% level of 
significance. 
 
 
Table 2 Own Price Labor Demand Elasticity Estimates: (Fixed and Random Effects Model) 
 Industries Fixed Effects Random effects 
Codes  ∆w ∆δw R2 ∆w ∆δw 
311 Food -0.22 
(0.16) 
-0.47 
(0.970) 
0.57 -0.19 
(0.148) 
-0.41   
(0.934) 
320 Textile -0.17 
(0.22) 
-0.16  
(1.638) 
0.72 -0.02 
(0.301) 
-4.29   
(2.201)* 
323 Leather -0.34  
(0.41) 
-0.09  
(3.096) 
0.12 -0.10  
(0.102) 
0.54    
(1.587) 
351 Ind. Chem -0.12 
(0.16) 
-0.12  
(1.797) 
0.73 -0.01  
(0.083) 
3.04    
(0.809)* 
352 Other IC -0.06 
(0.06) 
0.03   
(0.474) 
0.63 0.17  
(0.138) 
-0.55    
(1.267) 
369 Non-metal 0.64 
(0.33) 
0.86   
(2.355) 
0.62 0.08  
(0.182) 
0.60    
(1.781) 
371 Iron 
&Steel 
-0.18 
(0.24) 
-0.16  
(1.781) 
0.77 -0.02  
(0.129) 
-0.40   
(1.614) 
381 Fabricated -0.02  
(0.028) 
-0.02  
(0.212) 
0.25 0.14  
(0.136) 
0.14    
(1.037) 
382 Non-elect -0.35  
(0.451) 
-0.22  
(3.047) 
0.77 0.08  
(0.057) 
-1.5     
(0.794) 
383 Electrical -0.11   
(0.131) 
-0.04    
(0.984) 
0.27 -0.02   
(0.092) 
1.78   
(0.896)* 
384 Transport 0.18    
(0.186) 
-1.05    
(1.302) 
0.22 0.06    
(0.096) 
-0.75     
(1.005) 
Note: Values in parenthesis denotes S.E. 
* Null hypothesis rejected at 5% 
 
The only three industries where the null hypotheses of no elasticity change are rejected. 
These are Textile (320), Industrial Chemical (352) and Electrical Machinery (383). In 
these cases the ∆ w estimate is in absolute terms of the own price labor demand elasticity 
goes up. Krishna et al. (2001) two out of these three industries, namely, Industrial 
Chemical (352) and Electrical Machinery (383) also found increase in elasticities in post 
reform period in case of Turkey. Overall then, it appears that in our data industries, labor 
demand elasticities do not respond to changes in openness as predicted by the theory 
Rodrick (1997). 
 
Validity of Estimation Framework 
 
Several issues regarding the validity of the estimation framework and the interpretation of 
the results arise that explained in following steps. These issues are found in empirical 
literature. 
 
Simultaneity and Correlation problem 
• First is the familiar issue of possible simultaneity and correlation between the 
error term and the right-hand side variables. Since both labor demand and labor 
supply depend upon the wage, shocks to the labor demand will result in shocks to 
the wage. To the extent that, say, aggregate demand or productivity shocks 
increase product demand and raise labor demand and increase wages (or any other 
factor prices for that matter) at the same time, the elasticity estimates delivered 
from (13) would be biased due to a correlation between the error term and the 
right had side variable. Thus the wage and the disturbance term in our estimating 
equation may be correlated, thereby raising the possibility of a bias in our 
estimates. But in a well known contribution, Nickell and Symons (1990) have 
argued that the identification problem does not really exist anyway since labor 
supply and labor demand really depend upon two quite different real wages — 
one deflated by the producer price and one by the consumer price index. Thus 
using the appropriate real wage implies that simultaneity should not be a real 
problem.  
• The Endogeniety of the wage to changes in labor demand, the identifying 
assumption here clearly is that labor supplies facing each firm are perfectly 
elastic, i.e., that shifts in the labor supply curve (resulting in changes in wages) 
trace out the labor demand schedule and shocks to the labor demand do not affect 
wages. As Hammermesh (1993) notes, the suitability of this identifying 
assumption rests on the degree of disaggregation of the data. Since the data we 
use are firm level, thus quite heavily disaggregated, we do not consider this to be 
a serious issue here. Since large number of sample of  firms, it is improbable that 
any one buyer of factor inputs will have any market power in these factor 
markets. Thus, the plausibility of our identifying assumption is certainly greater 
than in most studies of this nature that use industry level data instead. 
• Instrumental variable estimation is perhaps a more satisfactory approach. It 
proves a little less feasible in each industry context: the using of the lagged 
variable is problematic due to short length of the data. The number of observation 
prior to reform is cut by half and overall numbers of observation is down by 
fourth even when we only use single year lag. One option that presents itself then 
is the pooling of data across industries to use lagged variables as instruments. 
 
Timing and lagged variables 
 
The second issue that concern of timing and lagged variables responses. It is assumed 
that in our estimation of equation (13) that firm demand responses to changes in wage 
rates occurred without lags. As Krishna et al. (2001) & Hammermesh (1993) has noted 
much of the adjustment in firm labor demand takes place within 6 months to 1 year. 
Thus, given that our data are annual then it is not a serious problem. 
 
Constancy of parameters across firms within industries 
 
Third issue is that of constancy of parameters across and within an industry or alternately 
of our implicit assumption that firms within an industry have identical wage elasticities. 
The data indicate that the measured (averaged) wage is quit different across firms within 
the same industry. We believe that this reflects unobserved differences in (average) 
worker quality across firms or to a smaller extent due to differences in the number of 
hours on the job put in by workers in different firms. Given such differences, it would be 
reasonable to expect that labor demand itself could be somewhat different across firms 
within an industry. Of course, to the extent that the differences are simply in levels and 
are fixed over time — our firm specific intercept should take care of the problem. 
However, one may expect the slopes to be different across firms within an industry as 
well. It is, nevertheless, infeasible to estimate firm specific elasticities and their changes 
for each firm when we only have four observations per firm. In order to address this 
issue, we experimented with a random coefficients (Hildreth–Houck) specification where 
the parameter estimates are firm specific but assumed to be drawn from a distribution that 
is common across firms within a given industry. The results remain the same 
qualitatively, i.e., the estimated changes in elasticities after the trade liberalization 
continue to be insignificantly different form zero in all cases. 
 
Labor Demand Elasticities of Non-Production and Production Workers: 
 
To make robustness and interest in the results of labor demand elasticities, we have 
estimate equation (13) by considering the demand for non-production workers. 
Elasticities of labor demand for all 11 industries are found under the fixed effect. All 
elasticities again quit tightly estimated. For non-production workers elasticities are also 
lie within the range -0.15 to -0.75, but the difference is that, elasticities of most industries 
are higher in magnitude as compare to production workers. These results are given in the 
following Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Elasticities of Production and Non-production Workers:  (Fixed Effect model) 
 Industries Production Workers Non-Production Workers 
Codes  ∆w ∆δw R2 ∆w ∆δw R2 
311 Food -0.22   
(0.16) 
-0.47 
(0.970) 
0.57 -0.19  
(0.36) 
-1.36  
(1.11) 
0.43 
320 Textile -0.17   
(0.22) 
-0.16  
(1.638) 
0.72 -0.30  
(0.22) 
-0.58  
(0.76) 
0.78 
323 Leather -0.34   
(0.41) 
-0.09  
(3.096) 
0.12  0.67  
(0.78) 
 0.15  
(0.89) 
0.22 
351 Ind. Chem -0.12   
(0.16) 
-0.12  
(1.797) 
0.73 -0.07  
(0.25) 
-0.85  
(0.79) 
0.65 
352 Other IC -0.06   
(0.06) 
 0.03   
(0.474) 
0.63 -0.03  
(0.04) 
-0.02  
(0.12) 
0.82 
369 Non-metal  0.64   
(0.33) 
 0.86   
(2.355) 
0.62 -0.37  
(0.42) 
-1.79  
(1.39) 
0.2 
371 Iron 
&Steel 
-0.18   
(0.24) 
-0.16  
(1.781) 
0.77 -0.36  
(0.29) 
-1.35  
(1.16) 
0.55 
381 Fabricated -0.02  
(0.028) 
-0.02  
(0.212) 
0.25  0.22  
(0.31) 
 1.18  
(0.93) 
0.13 
382 Non-elect -0.35  
(0.451) 
-0.22  
(3.047) 
0.77 -0.39  
(0.42) 
-0.99  
(1.29) 
0.72 
383 Electrical -0.11  
(0.131) 
-0.04   
(0.984) 
0.27  0.11  
(0.16) 
-0.46  
(0.65) 
0.79 
384 Transport  0.18   
(0.186) 
-1.05   
(1.302) 
0.22 -0.36  
(0.56) 
-0.39  
(0.34) 
0.25 
Values in parenthesis are S.E 
It is evident from results that our estimated elasticities change of non-production workers 
is much higher in magnitude as compare to production workers but still it is insignificant 
for all industries. This situation is consistent with Slaughter (2001) that labor demand 
elasticities does not increase for non-production but in contrast study finds support for the 
hypothesis in case of production workers. 
 
Thus even considering disaggregated type of labor (production & Non-production) does 
not alter the inference that we arrived at earlier that labor demand elasticities seem to be 
unresponsive to openness of international trade.  
 
Labor Demand Elasticities Overtime 
 
The outcomes of our estimation of labor demand elasticities and their changes overtime 
in each of the 11 industries are presented in Table 4 under the fixed and random effects 
model. 
 
Table 4  Over the Time Labor Demand Elasticity Estimates: (Fixed Effect Model) 
Major Industries Under Fixed Effect 
Codes  δw ∆δw R2 
311 Food 0.302 
(0.12) 
-0.271 
(0.04) 
0.99 
320 Textile 0.909 
(0.34) 
-0.816 
(0.12) 
0.98 
323 Leather 1.695 
(0.64) 
-1.544 
(0.22) 
0.99 
351 Indus. Chem 0.655 
(0.24) 
-0.586 
(0.08) 
0.99 
352 Other IC 0.251 
(0.09) 
-0.234 
(0.03) 
0.97 
369 Non-metallic -0.766 
(0.29) 
0.697 
(0.09) 
0.99 
371 Iron & Steel 0.987 
(0.39) 
-0.887 
(0.13) 
0.98 
381 Fabricated 0.117 
(0.04) 
-0.106 
(0.02) 
0.99 
382 Non-electrical -1.88 
(0.75) 
1.699 
(0.24) 
0.99 
383 Electrical 0.541 
(0.22) 
-0.491 
(0.07) 
0.98 
384 Transport 0.0166 
(0.02) 
-0.004 
    (0.01)** 
0.97 
  Values in parentheses are S.E  
   ** Null hypothesis cannot rejected at 5% level of significance. 
 
The purpose of this estimation, either the labor-demand elasticities becomes elastic over 
the time. In case of ten industries out of eleven industries the labor demand became more 
elastic over the time only in industry (384), the hypothesis of no elasticity change cannot 
be rejected. 
 
Results of Estimation Using Pooled Data across Industries 
 
In previous section, we estimated elasticities for each industry at individual level. These 
results indicate that the labor demand elasticities are unable to respond trade 
liberalization. In this section we see, at aggregate level how the labor demand response to 
openness and to change in protection level. We regress this by using pooled data set 
across eleven industries. Pooling of the data allow us to use variations in cross industry 
changes in the protection level and in openness as proxies for the trade reforms dummies. 
These results are presented in Table 5. 
 
As noted earlier, this was done with the intention of using instrumental variable 
techniques to control for any remaining simultaneity problem in the framework. We start 
estimate the equation (13) using pooled data (across industries) and using lagged right-
hand side variables as instruments variable. The instrument variables estimates for the 
pooled sample give us an elasticity estimate that is not as precisely estimated and again 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the trade reforms did not have any effect on the 
labor demand elasticity. 
 
Table 5 Regressions using pooled data over all industries 
Regression A Regression B Regression C 
Instrumental variables estimates 
with the reforms dummy 
interactions 
With Openness measurement  
(Fixed effect Model) 
With actual tariff rates  (Fixed 
effect Model) 
wδ -0.242 
(2.45) 
wδ -1.024 
 (0.67)       
wδ  -0.77 
(0.42)   
∆ wδ -1.076 
(5.53) 
)(opennesw ∂∂δ  
0.618  (2.39) 
)(tw ∂∂δ -0.002 
(0.01) 
R2   0.288        R2   0.662        R2   0.994 
Values in parenthesis are S.E 
 
Regression B uses openness measurement interaction instead of import penetration. 
Import penetration ratio used in study of et al Krishna et al. (2001). The openness 
measurement is used in place of trade reform dummy. The coefficient of the cross 
product of openness and the log of wage (deflated by industry price) gives us 
)(opennesw ∂∂δ , the derivative of the labor demand elasticity with respect to openness 1. 
The labor demand elasticity at zero openness wδ is estimated to be -1.024 and is 
significant at 10% level of significance. The estimate )(opennesw ∂∂δ  is 0.61 and it is 
insignificant at 5%. It means that the higher openness is not associated with the higher 
magnitude of labor demand elasticities. 
 
Regression C uses the actual tariff rates interaction. The tariff rates are used in place of 
trade reform dummy. The coefficient of the cross product of t and the log of wage 
(deflated by industry price) gives us )(tw ∂∂δ , the derivative of the labor demand 
elasticity with respect to the tariff rate. The labor-demand elasticity at zero tariffs wδ is 
estimated to be 0.769 and is significant at the 5% level. The estimate for )(tw ∂∂δ is -
0.0016 and is insignificant at 5% level. Surprisingly, the sign of this co-efficient show 
that higher tariffs are associated with higher magnitudes of labor demand elasticities. 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
The objective of this study the responsiveness of the labor-demand elasticities under trade 
liberalization by disaggregated for each eleven industries in the manufacturing sector of 
Pakistan and responsiveness over the time as well as analyze the behavior of the labor 
demand elasticities at aggregate level with the openness to international trade, tariff rate 
and lagged own price of labor.   
  
Labor demand elasticities for each eleven industries are measure by using fixed effect 
and random effect model. Analyses suggest that the putative linkage between greater 
trade liberalization and labor demand elasticities (as suggested by theory) may be 
empirically weak. Under fixed effect model, labor demand elasticities of all eleven 
industries shows unresponsiveness to trade liberalization how ever under random effect 
model, in the vast majority we considered separately. We are unable to find significant 
relationship between these variables for both production and non-production workers. 
However, labor demand elasticities behave differently over the time. These became more 
elastic over the time. Hence trade liberalization has neither positive nor negative impact 
on labor demand in manufacturing sector of Pakistan. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1 
Tariff Structure in Pakitan 
 
                                                                                 Tariff Rate (%)                                  
 
        Year                            Minimum                    Maximum               Average Rate 
 
 
1987-88 13.3 250.0 40.7 
1988-89 16.1 155.2 36.0 
1989-90 10.0 128.6 39.7 
1990-91 12.6 151.2 39.0 
1991-92 12.1 181.0 32.6 
1992-93 17.7 270.1 35.3 
1993-94 13.4 166.7 34.7 
1994-95 0.3 128.6 21.6 
1995-96 0.5 110.3 25.5 
1997-98 3.3 84.9 18.3 
1999-00 0.0 40.0 12.3 
2000-01 0.1 111.1 10.5 
2001-02 1.8 44.1 9.1 
2002-03 0.1 33.0 9.3 
2003-04 0.0 32.2 9.4 
 
       Source: CBR Year Book, 1995-96& various year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
